Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 1

Article 3

11-1-1987

Joint Tenancy: Notice of Severance; Mortgages and Survivorship
Taylor Mattis

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Suggested Citation
Taylor Mattis, Joint Tenancy: Notice of Severance; Mortgages and Survivorship, 7 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 41
(1987).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons. For
more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Joint Tenancy: Notice of Severance;
Mortgages and Survivorship
TAYLOR MATTIS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court of Illinois on joint
tenancies have created an opportunity for the Illinois legislature to
complement both decisions in advancing several socially desirable
goals. The goals to be advanced are: effectuating the legitimate
expectations of the parties to a joint tenancy; protecting the lender in
secured transactions and thereby facilitating the flow of credit without
unwanted and unnecessary side arrangements; and promoting informed decision-making by one tenant in real property when a cotenant takes action that affects the former's interest.
The two decisions are Minonk State Bank v. Grassman' and
Harms v. Sprague.2 State Bank held that a deed from a joint tenant
conveying her interest to herself as tenant in common was effective
to sever the right of survivorship and terminate the joint tenancy.
Harms held that a mortgage by one joint tenant did not sever the
right of survivorship, and that when the mortgaging joint tenant died,
the lien of the mortgage was extinguished. Both of these decisions
have much to commend them, especially for adding momentum to
the trend away from honoring the "unities" metaphysics and toward
giving the intent of the parties determinative effect.' However, both
* "Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law; B.A.,
University of Alabama; J.D., University of Miami; LL.M., Yale University; Member
of Illinois and Florida bars."
1. 95 11. 2d 392, 447 N.E.2d 822 (1983).
2. 105 Ill. 2d 215, 473 N.E.2d 930 (1984).

3. The trend is illustrated by e.g., Tindall v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 64 N.E.2d
903 (1946); Tenhet v. Boswell, 18 Cal. 3d 150, 554 P.2d 330, 133 Cal. Rptr. 10
(1976). The doctrine that the four "unities of time, title, interest, and possession"
were essential to the creation and continuance of a joint tenancy arose from the
concept that there was a single, though concurrent, estate in the joint tenants as a
unit. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK AND D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY §

5.3 (1984). The four unities dogma serves no present-day policy. See generally Mattis,
Severance of Joint Tenancies by Mortgages: A Contextual Approach, 1977 So. ILL.
U.L.J. 27 (overview of the societal and economic consequences of a mortgage by
one joint tenant on the estate itself).
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of these decisions leave work to be done in order to prevent problems
that would otherwise result from the new law they create. The
proposed legislation would prevent these problems.
II.

STATE BANK: UNILATERAL SEVERANCE OF A JOINT TENANCYTHE NOTICE PROBLEM

At common law a joint tenancy was destroyed by agreement
between or among the joint tenants to partition their land. Without
agreement, there were two methods for unilaterally achieving severance of the estate. One joint tenant could obtain severance by either
bringing an action for partition, 4 or by conveying his interest in the
estate to another person.' Notoriety inhered in both of these methods
for unilateral severance. A joint tenant could hardly sue in partition
without the defendant joint tenant's knowledge. As for severance by
conveyance, livery of seizin provided great notoriety as long as livery
6
was required to transfer a present possessory estate of freehold.
The long overdue recognition that we no longer require livery of
seizin to convey real property was the basis for the decision in State
Bank that a joint tenant could sever by conveying to herself. In 1826
the Fifth General Assembly provided that livery of seizin was no
longer necessary for the conveyance of real property and that a
writing was sufficient to effectuate a conveyance. 7 While an attempt
to enfeoff oneself, possibly by handing oneself a clod of dirt, would
be "ungainly, ' 8 executing a deed to oneself can be accomplished
quite gracefully. 9 And, rightly understood, the requirement that a
deed be delivered to be effective poses no difficulties in the transaction
4. 31 Hen. 8, ch. 1 (1539) (applying to estates of inheritance); 32 Hen. 8, ch.
32 (1540) (extending the application to cotenants for life or for years).
5. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 185-86.
6. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW § 12 at 224 (5th ed.
reprinted 1966); Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal. 570, 573, 140
P. 242, 244 (1914).

7. Ill. Rev. Code 95 (1826) (current version at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, para.

1 (1985)).

8. Riddle v. Harmon, 102 Cal. App. 3d 524, 528-29, 162 Cal. Rptr. 530, 533
(1980), quoted in Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 95 Il1. 2d 392, 395-96, 447 N.E.2d
822, 824 (1983).
9. The Inheritance Act of 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 106, sec. 3, abolishing the
doctrine of worthier title, apparently allowed one to convey to oneself: "[W]hen any
land shall have been limited, by any assurance [deed] executed . . . to the person .. who shall thereby have conveyed the same land, such person shall be
considered to have acquired the same as a purchaser by virtue of such assurance . ..."
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of conveying to oneself. Delivery of a deed does not necessarily mean
manual tradition. 10 Rather, delivery of a deed means the grantor
intends that the instrument presently operate as a conveyance of an
interest in land."
Before State Bank a joint tenant desiring to sever by conveyance
would convey her undivided interest in Blackacre to a straw, who
would reconvey to her. The technical, ceremonial aspects of the straw
transaction perpetuated a long-dead feudal concept, but the intent to
sever which it so clearly demonstrated was the controlling issue. It
was the expression of intent by one joint tenant that severed, with or
without the knowledge or consent of the other joint tenant. 2
The appellate and supreme courts' opinions in State Bank quite
logically concluded that this indirect method of conveyance to a straw
and back again was idle. "[A] joint tenant may unilaterally sever a
joint tenancy without the use of an intermediary."'" She may do
"with one piece of paper what otherwise would have required two.' ' 4
Judge Mills, writing for the appellate court, noted that acknowledging
this ability is not an extension of new rights to the parties." Nor, one
might add, does it deprive a passive joint tenant of any rights to
notice because she had none when severance was accomplished by the
straw ritual.
Interestingly enough, the party unsuccessfully resisting severance
in State Bank was the joint tenant who had conveyed to herself as
tenant in common by a deed reciting that its sole purpose was to
dissolve all rights of survivorship. Her sister, the erstwhile joint tenant,
died unaware of what the severing sister had done. The latter,
incompetent at the time of the litigation, argued through her guardian
ad litem that the unilateral conveyance was ineffective. There was no
10. See, e.g., McMahon v. Dorsey, 353 Mich. 623, 91 N.W.2d 893 (1958)

(perhaps the leading case for this proposition-the deed was found in the grantor

and grantee's safety deposit box after the grantor's death); Maciaszek v. Maciaszek,
21 Ill. 2d 542, 173 N.E.2d 476 (1961) (grantor's recording of the deed, though he

retained it and made no manual tradition to the grantee, shows a prima facie intention
that the deed become legally operative); Berrigan v. Berrigan, 413 Ill. 204, 108 N.E.2d
438 (1952).
11. R.

CUNNINGHAM,

W.

STOEBUCK AND

D. WmTMAN, THE LAW OF

PROPERTY

§ 11.3 (1984).
12. Minonk State Bank v. Grassman, 103 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 1109-11, 432
N.E.2d 386, 388-90 (4th Dist. 1982), aff'd, 95 Ill. 2d 392, 447 N.E.2d 822 (1983).
13. Id. at 1112, 432 N.E.2d at 391. The supreme court adopted the rationale
of the appellate court. 95 Ill. 2d at 395, 447 N.E.2d at 824.
14. Minonk State Bank, 103 Il. App. 3d at 1112, 432 N.E.2d at 391.
15. Id.
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indication, however, that had the severer died first, and the survivor
been ignorant of the change to tenancy in common, the results would
have been different. To the contrary, the court was careful to point
of a passive joint
out that with or without the consent or knowledge
6
tenant unilateral severance can be effective.'

This is unfortunate. It is not a result of the State Bank case, for
that has been the law, so far as this author can ascertain, at least

since livery of seizin was abandoned as the method of transferring
present freeholds. Even before that, notorious as livery of seizin might
have been, an absent joint tenant, perhaps away on a crusade, might

not receive actual knowledge that his tenancy had been severed by his
joint tenant's livery of seizin to a straw and receipt back again.
The ability unilaterally to sever is not what is unfortunate, for
the consent or permission of the other joint tenant should not be
required. After all, joint tenants hold per my et per tout. The per
my, by the moities or parts, aspect of the estate is the right of
unilateral severance during the lives of the tenants. It is as grand an
incident of the estate as is the right of survivorship if no severance
occurs. If the parties want to enjoy an estate with a nonseverable

right of survivorship, they should take title as joint life tenants with

a contingent remainder in the survivor. 7 Instead, having clearly
expressed their intent that title be in joint tenancy, 8 the parties, or
their grantor, expressed their consent from the outset that each tenant
shall enjoy the unilateral power to sever.' 9
What is unfortunate is that, as the law has evolved, the power
to sever may be exercised without any notice to the passive joint

16. Id. at 1110, 432 N.E.2d at 390.

17. The formula for the granting clause would be "to A and B for their joint
lives, then to the survivor of A and B." The contingent remainder in the survivor is
indestructible in Illinois, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, para. 40 (1985), as in most other
states. Of course, both parties could join to convey a fee, or the right of survivorship
could be released. However, the consent of both tenants would be required.
18. A statute in Illinois, and similar statutes in most other jurisdictions, assures
that a joint tenancy will not be inadvertently created. The Illinois statute requires
express language of joint tenancy to negate the presumption that a tenancy in
common was intended. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 76, para. 1 (1985). The intent of the
grantor in a gratuitous conveyance should, of course, be controlling. In a purchase
of land, it is up to the grantees to see that the grantor's conveyance creates for them
the type of estate they wish to purchase. See Mattis, supra note 3 at 34 n.33.
19. Cf. Stromsen v. Stromsen, 397 Ill. 260, 263, 73 N.E.2d 272, 273 (1947)
(An agreement not to partition property to be held in cotenancy, made before taking
title, is "utterly inconsistent with taking title as joint tenants without any restriction
upon the rights of the joint tenant." Thus, it would have no effect.).
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tenant. Under the practice of severing by straw conveyance and back
again, prior to State Bank, any recording of the deeds gave no real
notice to the passive joint tenant. Similarly, the recording of a single
deed of severance pursuant to State Bank gives no real notice.
Recording is to put subsequent purchaserson notice of a prior adverse
claim. 20 The passive joint tenant acquired her interest at the same time
as, not subsequent to, her co-tenant. When one person has the power
to affect the property rights of another, the power-holder should be
required to give reasonable notice to the other that his status has been
altered.
The final argument of the losing party in State Bank and the
court's response to that argument indicate some concern regarding
the reliance interest of the tenant whose right of survivorship has
been severed.2' The argument was that the creation of a joint tenancy
is "akin to a quasi contract or shared common venture" and that the
court's ruling would no longer allow the parties to that "joint
venture" to rely upon that relationship. The court responded: "We
recognize that in certain situations, e.g., where consideration is given
for the creation of a joint tenancy or one of the joint tenants takes
some irrevocable action in reliance upon the creation or existence of
a joint tenancy, problems may arise if one tenant may unilaterally
dissolve the joint tenancy.' '22
The argument and the court's response missed the mark. It is not
unilateral severance by direct ratherthan straw conveyance (which is
what State Bank allows) that defeats the reliance interest of the
passive joint tenant. Rather it is the allowance of unilateral severance
20. A frequently quoted statement of Chancellor Walworth is: "The whole
object of recording acts is to protect subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers
against previous deeds, mortgages, etc., which are not recorded; and to deprive the
holder of the prior unregistered conveyance or mortgage of the right which his
priority would have given him at common law." Stuyvesant v. Hill, 2 Barb. 151, 158
(N.Y. 1847), cited in 4 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 17.10, at 556 n.l (A. Casner
ed. 1952).
21. Ironically, the argument was made by the guardian ad litem of the tenant
who had done the severing. See supra, text accompanying note 16.
22. 95 I11.
2d at 396, 447 N.E.2d at 825. It has been held that partition will
not be awarded in equity over the objection of a joint tenant where there has been
an agreement not to partition. Hardin v. Wolf, 318 I11.
48, 148 N.E. 868 (1925). But

cf. Stromsen v. Stromsen, 397 I11.
260, 73 N.E.2d 272 (1947), discussed supra note
19; Heldt v. Heldt, 29 II1. 2d 61, 193 N.E.2d 7 (1963), where the court refused to

consider a want of equity as a bar to the right to partition in the absence of fraud

or coercion attending the creation of the tenancy. An agreement not to partition a

tenancy in common has been held void as an unreasonable restraint against alienation.
Reisch v. Schuster, 47 Ohio App. 2d 98, 352 N.E.2d 657 (1975).
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without knowledge of the passive joint tenant-long the accepted
law-that is the problem. Nonetheless, that problem will likely be
exacerbated by the one-party conveyance rule and its likely progeny.
The easier, the less ceremonial the severance, the greater the likelihood
of secrecy. Moreover, there are indications and logical arguments
pointing to even easier and less ceremonious severances than the oneparty conveyance.
At the end of the supreme court's response quoted above, the
court cited Hendrickson v. Minneapolis Federal Savings & Loan
Association.23 The appellate court also had cited the Hendrickson
case.24 That case involved, not a deed, but a one-party instrument
called a "Declaration of Election to Sever Survivorship of Joint
Tenancy." There was no indication in the opinion that the wife, the
passive joint tenant, knew of the instrument. It was executed the same
day that the husband joint tenant executed his will devising his interest
in the property to another. It was held effective to sever the joint
tenancy into a tenancy in common so that, two months later, at the
husband's death, his devisee became a tenant in common with his
widow.
Logic and common sense support the conclusion that if a joint
tenant can sever by a one-party instrument entitled "Deed" or "Conveyance," then he can sever by a one-party instrument entitled
"Declaration of Election to Sever." Furthermore, if the interest of a
joint tenant can be devised, as it now can be in Illinois, by using two
pieces of paper (the instrument of severence and then the will), then
logic dictates that one piece of paper (the will) suffices, where the
election to sever is clearly expressed in the first part of the document
(expressly intended to be effective immediately as a severance), and
then the moity is devised. 25 The surprise that will likely result to the
passive joint tenant is no bar to the severance, for notice has never
been required to exercise the unilateral right to sever. However, the
"new" problem referred to in the introduction to this article that will

23. 281 Minn. 462, 161 N.W.2d 688 (1968), cited in State Bank, 95 Ill. 2d at
396, 447 N.E.2d at 845.
24. 103 Ill. App. 3d at 1112, 432 N.E.2d at 390.
25. Cf. Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922
(1950) (In a jurisdiction where a possibility of reverter is devisable, a possibility of
reverter left in the testator's estate as a result of a void executory interest after a
devise of a fee simple determinable in the first part of the will passed to the residuary
legatees named in the last part of the will. The residuary legatees to whom the
possibility of reverter validly passed were the same takers named in the invalid
executory interest.).
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result from State Bank, absent legislation, is really an exacerbation
of an existing problem. As severance becomes easier, less ceremonial,
and more ecret, the incidence of surprised survivors will increase.
Legislation is needed to provide for notice to the passive joint
tenant as a condition of unilateral severance. From the vantage of the
passive joint tenant, such legislation should provide that unilateral
severance is not effective unless knowledge of the severance is brought
home to the passive joint tenant. However, this requirement would
be a title examiner's nightmare. A title examiner would be hardpressed to ascertain whether a grantee from a joint tenant had received
a tenancy in common interest or nothing because it would depend
upon the state of mind of the passive joint tenant. The legislation
must be carefully drafted to protect titles of grantees from a passive
joint tenant's objection that she did not know of the severance. The
method for notifying a passive joint tenant must strike a balance
between providing the tenant with certain knowledge of the severance,
and providing title examiners with reliable evidence of severance.
Furthermore, the procedure for giving and preserving evidence of
notice to the passive joint tenant must be simple, so that real estate
transactions will not be burdened.
Proposed legislation, drafted in an attempt to achieve these
purposes, is attached as Appendix 1. If this proposed legislation
becomes law, it will in almost all cases prevent the surprise that could
otherwise result to a surviving former joint tenant upon learning of
severance by her cotenant during his lifetime. This will promote
informed decision-making, protecting estate planning by a tenant
whose cotenant has elected to sever.
III.

HARMS: EFFECT OF MORTGAGE ON SURVIVORSHIP-EFFECT OF
SURVIVORSHIP ON MORTGAGE

26
Dicta in many Illinois cases prior to Harms v. Sprague asserted
that the execution of a mortgage by one joint tenant severed the right
of survivorship.2 7 Severance followed from the destruction of one of
the unities. In a "title theory" jurisdiction, the execution of a
mortgage conveys title to the mortgagee. So long as Illinois considered
itself a title theory jurisdiction, the mortgaging tenant held a different

2d 215, 473 N.E.2d 930 (1984).
26. 105 Ill.
27. Eleven such cases are cited and discussed in Mattis, Severance of Joint
Tenancies by Mortgages: A Contextual Approach, 1977 So. ILL. U.L.J. 27, 50-52,

cited in Harms v. Sprague, 119 11. App. 3d 503, 456 N.E.2d 976, 978 (1983), aff'd,
2d 215, 473 N.E.2d 930 (1984).
105 Ill.
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interest from the non-mortgaging tenant, and severance followed as
a logical result of the execution of the mortgage. Surprise and hardship
could result from the unintentional severance of a joint tenancy that
was intentionally created2" and that was legitimately expected to

persist. Further, this scenario is especially troublesome in that an
unintentional severance could result in surprise to either tenant. Even
if the loan secured by the mortgage had been paid off before either
tenant died, deference to the altar of the sacred unities required that
severance result.29

The long overdue recognition that Illinois had developed into a

jurisdiction following the "lien theory" of mortgages 0 was the basis
for the first holding in the Harms decision, that the execution of a

mortgage by one joint tenant does not sever the right of survivorship.
The decision substantially advanced the goal of effectuating joint

tenants' legitimate expectations about survivorship.3 ' The second holding of Harms was that a mortgage by a joint tenant does not survive
the death of the mortgagor as a lien on the property. Leaving the

lender unsecured in such a situation simply means that, in the future,

mortgage money will not be available for a joint tenant mortgagor
absent an express acquiesence to the lien by the non-mortgaging

tenant.
The facts of the case were these: William and John, brothers,
owned Blackacre as joint tenants. John and his friend Charles executed a promissory note in favor of the Simmonses for $7,000 and
John secured it by a mortgage of his undivided one-half interest in

Blackacre. Incidentally, William was unaware of the mortgage given

by his brother. John died, devising all his real and personal property

to Charles. In the litigation brought by William to quiet title, the
28. See supra note 18.
29. In re Pollard's Estate, 46 Eng. Rep. 746 (1863); 2 AMEUcAN LAW OP
PROPERTY § 6.2 at 9 n.7 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
30. Sometime about the turn of the century, Illinois began moving away from
the title theory of mortgages. In Kling v. Ghilarducci, 3 Ill. 2d 454, 460, 121 N.E.2d
752, 756 (1954), the lien theory was clearly adopted for the first time: "In Illinois
the giving of a mortgage is not a separation of title, for the holder of the mortgage
takes only a lien thereunder." In Illinois mortgages are now generally spoken of as
creating liens. See cases cited in Harms v. Sprague, 119 Il1. App. 3d 503, 507, 456
N.E.2d 976, 979 (1983), alf'd, 105 Ill. 2d 215, 473 N.E.2d 930 (1984).
31. "The parties intended survivorship when the joint tenancy was created.
Until an intent to terminate that right is manifested, the court should endeavor to
protect it." Note, Real Property: Effect of a Contract to Convey by Joint Tenants:
Buford v. Dahlke, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 154, 155 (1955), quoted in Illinois Public Aid
Comm'n v. Stille, 14 III. 2d 344, 352, 153 N.E.2d 59, 63 (1958).
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mortgagees and Charles contended for severance. In ruling for William, both the appellate and supreme courts devoted most of their
opinions to the survivorship issue. The ruling against the mortgagees,
the Simmonses, was based on the rationale that William "succeeds to
the share of the deceased joint tenant by virtue of the conveyance
which created the joint tenancy, not as the successor of the deceased. "32 Since John's interest in the unsevered joint tenancy was
extinguished when he died, there was no longer a property interest to
which the mortgage lien could attach.
This is perfectly logical joint tenancy theory. The problem is 'that
it does not address the policies we want to foster and the economic
realities that must be recognized in order to advance those policies.
The major policy that this author assumes as socially desirable is the
preservation of joint tenancies. 3 In addition, making loan funds
available on the security of joint tenancy interests may be a desirable
policy in itself.14 However, in this discussion, facilitating joint tenancy
mortgages is presented as a means to the goal of preserving joint
tenancies. This argument-that making joint tenancy interests "mortgageable" will preserve joint tenancies-is based on two predictions.
First, the second holding of Harms will be known to lending officers
of financial institutions.3" If the law in Illinois is not changed, they
will be aware that a mortgage on the interest of a joint tenant is as
fragile as a mortgage on a life estate. Institutional lenders will be
unlikely to lend on the strength of such a mortgage. The lenders who
will be hurt by the second holding in Harms are the Uncle Joe
mortgagees, or individuals like the Simmonses in the case of Harms
v. Sprague. Second, in many cases, the borrower will sever the joint
tenancy, as that will be required in order to get the mortgage loan.
It is clear that when the lender insists on severance as a condition
of the loan, it is not expressing a concern as to the identity of the
ultimate owner of the land at the mortgagor's death. Its concern is
not whether the ultimate owner will take as a surviving joint tenant,
32. Harms v. Sprague, supra note 30 at 224, 473 N.E.2d at 934.
33. See supra note 31.
34. See Mattis, supra note 27 at 58-59 (a discussion of the policy rationale for
promoting credit extension through mortgage financing as applied to the "mortgageability" of joint tenancy interests).
35. Wide publicity given to Harms v. Sprague includes discussion in the
following publications: 74 ILL. B.J. 354 (1986); Joint Tenancy Not Severed by
Mortgage, 8 ILL. FUND CONCEPT 6 (1984); Postel, Mortgage Doesn't Sever Joint
Tenancy, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., May 7, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Cm. DAILY L. BULL., May
31, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
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as a devisee, or as an heir of the mortgagor. Rather, the lender is
expressing its concern that the interest owned by the borrowermortgagor at the time of the loan remain subject to the mortgage.
The only way it can obtain that security from the real estate under
present Illinois law is to have all the joint tenants execute the
mortgage 6 or insist that the borrower sever the joint tenancy.
It is natural that a lender will want all the signatures it can get
to obligate the signers in some way for the repayment or security of
the loan. Nonetheless, a joint tenant who does not share the borrower
joint tenant's enthusiasm for the loan may refuse to subject her
interest in the estate to a mortgage. In such a situation, if the lender
is persuaded that the interest of the borrowing joint tenant in the
estate is sufficient to cover the amount of the loan, 7 an institutional
lender will likely insist on a severance38 as a condition of the loan. If
the borrowing joint tenant agrees, and severs the joint tenancy without
further attention to the devolution of the estate, then he and his
former joint tenant have lost their survivorship rights. Heirs that
neither of the joint tenants wanted to share ownership may now come
into ownership of the estate. The tenants could head off that undesired
result by executing wills.
What we have, then, is a joint tenancy interest that is worthless
as security for a loan; a lender that is willing to lend if there is
severance; and severance that causes consequences as to the devolution
of Blackacre that neither tenant wants and as to which the lender is
indifferent. Side arrangements, in this case two wills and the probate
of one estate, are necessary to recoup the loss of the survivorship
feature of the joint tenancy. It is likely that in many of these cases
the borrower, in order to get the loan, will sever the joint tenancy
and intend to patch up his "estate plan" by executing a will when he
36. If ail joint tenants execute a mortgage, the fee simple is subject to it, and
the joint tenancy is not severed. Estate of Kotz, 486 Pa. 444, 458, 406 A.2d 524, 531
(1979); Illinois Pub. Aid Comm'n v. Stille, 14 II. 2d 344, 353-54, 153 N.E.2d 59,
63-64 (1958) (dictum). See Mattis, supra note 27 at 42 n.2.
37. Of course, many institutional lenders will usually not authorize a mortgage
on property held in tenancy in common unless all interest holders sign the document
because of the extra trouble and expense of a partition action, which may well be a
practical necessity upon foreclosure. This unwillingness is not always the case,
especially where the value of the interest of the tenant in common comfortably
exceeds the amount of the loan. See Mattis, supra note 27 at 52-55 (Illinois survey
taken of institutional lenders in certain Illinois cities to determine their willingness to
extend a loan to a joint tenant as compared to a tenant in common).
38. This is easily accomplished in view of Minonk State Bank v. Grassman,
supra note 1, where no straw person is necessary.
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gets around to it. Whether he and his cotenant will actually get around
to it in time, or whether after the loan is repaid and the mortgage is
released he and his cotenant will re-institute the joint tenancy, is
problematic. The benefits of the joint tenancy estate, benefits espe-

cially worthy of protection as between husbands and wives and other
close family members, will to some extent be lost.

The solution is to protect the lender without severing the joint

tenancy. This is not a startling innovation. In 1895 the Supreme Court
of Indiana in Wilken v. Young,3 9 held that the mortgagee is protected,

but the joint tenancy continues so that the other joint tenant takes

the equity of redemption of the mortgagor if the mortgagor prede-

ceases him. This case is cited in American Law of Property as the
"leading case," 4 and cited in two old Illinois cases for other propositions. 4' Harms v. Sprague foreclosed the judicial adoption of this
position in Illinois. Legislation should be enacted to provide that the
interest of the surviving joint tenant is subject to the lien of the

mortgage to the extent of the interest of the mortgaging joint tenant
just before her death.

Wisconsin has a statute achieving this result. In Wisconsin a
real estate mortgage on the interest of a joint tenant does not defeat
the right of survivorship in the event of the death of such joint
tenant, but the surviving joint tenant takes the interest such deceased

39. 144 Ind. 1, 41 N.E. 68 (1895).
40. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.2, at 9, 10 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). The
ALP text comments that the Wilken case is wrong "on principle" in not declaring a
severance because after the mortgage is executed there is no longer the unity of
interest which is required even if the unity of title has not been severed. It is submitted
that no principle is "wronged," but only the concept of the sacred unities, which
has no social or economic utility whatsoever.
App. 3d 503, 507-508, 456
The Appellate Court in Harms v. Sprague, 119 I11.
2d 215, 473 N.E.2d 930 (1984), rejected the
N.E.2d 976, 980 (1983), aff'd, 105 I11.
suggestion that a mortgage by one joint tenant destroys the unity of interest rather
than the unity of title. The court reasoned: It is well established in Illinois that a
perfected judgment lien on one joint tenant's interest does not sever the joint tenancy.
A mortgage lien causes no greater reduction in a joint tenant's interest than a
judgment lien.
41. Lawler v. Byrne, 252 I1l. 194, 96 N.E. 892 (1911), the earliest Illinois
opinion stating in dicta that a mortgage by a joint tenant operates as a severance,
incorrectly citing Wilken for that proposition. A later case cited Wilken as support
for a rule that the individual interest of one joint tenant is subject to levy and sale
App. 585, 593 (in official
upon an execution against him. Spikings v. Ellis, 290 I11.

reporter Wilken is miscited as "Wilson v. Younger", but Wilken is correctly cited in

the regional reporter), 8 N.E.2d 962, 965 (1937).
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joint tenant could have transferred prior to death subject to such

mortgage .42

One might have thought that Illinois already had legislation
providing for the persistence of mortgages and liens after a debtorjoint-tenant's death by the plain language of section 20-19(a) of the
Probate Act of 1975:
When any real estate . . . subject to an encumbrance . . .
passes by joint tenancy with right of survivorship . . . [the]
surviving tenant ...to whom the real estate ... passes, takes
it subject to the encumbrance and is not entitled to have the
indebtedness paid from other real or personal estate of the
43
decedent.
This statute, however, has been construed not to sustain a
judgment lien or a mortgage as an encumbrance on joint tenancy
property where the deceased joint tenant was the judgment debtor or
mortgagor. That construction, as to judgment liens, resulted principally from the title of the statute: "No Exoneration of Encumbered
Interests in Real Estate." The Appellate Court in Merchants National
Bank v. Olson" reasoned: "[The statute] abrogates the doctrine of
exoneration 45 in respect to the right of a surviving joint tenant to have
42. Wis. Stat. § 700.24 (1981). The statute also protects enumerated statutory
liens and security interests other than real estate mortgages. It does not, however,
extend to preserve judgment liens that are not levied and executed during the judgment
debtor joint tenant's lifetime. Northern State Bank v. Toal, 69 Wis. 2d 50, 230
N.W.2d 153 (1975).
South Dakota goes further to provide that a joint tenant is personally liable for
debts of a deceased joint tenant up to the amount contributed to the jointly owned
property by the deceased joint tenant. S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 30-21A-4 (1984).
43. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110 1/2 para. 20-19(a) (1985).
44. 27 11. App. 3d 432, 325 N.E.2d 633 (1975).
45. At common law a devisee of real estate mortgaged by the testator in his
lifetime was entitled to have the lien discharged by payment from the testator's
personal estate, unless the testator directed otherwise in his will. This rule was
generally referred to as the doctrine of exoneration and was the law in Illinois. Some
states took the view that the surviving joint tenant and the estate of the deceased
tenant must share equally in the payment of a joint obligation, even though it was
secured by a mortgage on the joint tenancy estate. Other states held that the burden
of the debt passed with the title to the property, and that the survivor must discharge
the obligation in full without contribution from the estate of the deceased tenant.
The Illinois position on the partial exoneration of the surviving joint tenant was
unclear.
To resolve these and other related questions, the 1967 legislature enacted this
statute (originally section 219b of the Probate Act). It abrogates the doctrine of
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liens on the real estate paid . . . out of the decedent's probate estate.
The statute assumes the existence of a lien indebtedness against the
real estate interest.' ' (In other words, the real estate must be "subject
to an encumbrance" after the death of the decedent; in a commonlaw joint tenancy situation the property interest of the joint tenant
ends at his death, so ends the lien attached to his interest). The same
statute was argued on appeal to sustain the mortgage in Harms v.
Sprague. The Supreme Court of Illinois first held that the applicability
exoneration in respect to, inter alia, the right of a specific devisee to have the realty
freed from liens thereon at the expense of other real or personal estate of the
decedent, and the right of a surviving joint tenant to have liens on the real estate
held in joint tenancy paid in whole or in part out of the decedent's probate estate.
4 JAMES, ILLINOIS PROBATE LAW

AND PRACTICE,

1975 pocket part by A. Fleming,

§ 219b-219b.2 at 234-240.
The Olson court (supra note 44) relied on Fleming's analysis of the "no
exoneration" statute, now Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110 1/2, para. 20-19 (1985). One assumes
that the court thought that the statute should apply to abrogate exoneration of
encumbrances of joint tenancy estates only where the debt was the joint obligation
of both tenants. But Fleming comments that "[n]o distinction is made [in the statute]
with respect to the origin of the indebtedness, i.e. whether created by the decedent
or by another." 4 James, supra at 238.
Notwithstanding Fleming's comment, the Olson court concluded that the statute
was never intended to alter or affect a creditor's lien after the death of the debtor
joint tenant. Judge Thomas J. Moran, then a member of the Appellate Court,
concurred in the Olson opinion. Now a judge of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
Justice Moran wrote the opinion in Harms v. Sprague. Interestingly enough, the
Harms opinion does not refer to Olson or its rationale. Perhaps this somewhat
cursory treatment of the statute in the Harms case was because the court held the
issue to have been waived. The only rationale expressed was: "[Blecause we have
found that the lien of mortgage no longer exists against the property, section 20-19
is inapplicable, since plaintiff, as the surviving joint tenant, did not take the property
subject to an encumbrance." 105 Il. 2d at 226, 473 N.E.2d at 935.
Both the Olsen (appellate) and Harms (supreme) courts seem to read the statute
as applying "when any real estate passes by joint tenancy and remains subject to an
encumbrance." However, the application clause of the statute reads "[wihen any real
estate

. . .

subject to an encumbrance ...

passes by joint tenancy .

. . ."

The result

clause of the statute provides that the surviving tenant takes the joint tenancy
property subject to the encumbrance and is not entitled to have the indebtedness paid
from other estate of the decedent. In ruling that the statute is inapplicable, the Harms
court leaves the mortgagees to their suit on the note. The decedent's other estate
then will be liable for the indebtedness. The common-law doctrine of exoneration is
thus revitalized as to a surviving joint tenant. See generally 74 ILL. B.J. 354, 356
(1986).
This result is counter to the purpose and language of the statute. Nonetheless,
it seems that section 20-19 of the Probate Act has been rendered impotent in protecting
mortgagees of an individual joint tenant's interest in real property.
46. Merchants National Bank, 27 Ill. App. 3d at 434, 325 N.E.2d at 634.
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of the statute was "waived" because the issue was not raised at trial.
It then went on to say that the statute was inapplicable since the court
existed against
had just held that the lien of the mortgage no longer
47
the property once the debtor joint tenant had died.
Since no Illinois statute now applies to counter the present
common-law doctrine that, in effect, closes the commercial mortgage
market to individual joint tenants, the draft set forth in Appendix 2
to this article is proposed for adoption by the legislature. The first
sentence contains the gist of the proposal:
A real estate mortgage on the interest of a joint tenant does
not defeat the right of survivorship in the event of the death
of such joint tenant, but the surviving joint tenant or tenants
take the interest that such deceased joint tenant could have
transferred prior to death subject to such mortgage.
The first clause merely codifies the first holding of Harms v.
Sprague. The right of survivorship persists, so that the identity of the
owner or owners of the property, after the death of the mortgagor,
is not changed by the execution of the mortgage. Nor will there be
any necessity for administration of an estate to keep the ownership
as the tenants originally desired. The policy of effectuating the
legitimate expectations of the parties to the joint tenancy is protected.
Under no circumstances will the surviving tenant be worse off than if
the mortgaging tenant had severed. The survivor either benefits or
breaks even.
The second clause of the first sentence of the proposed statute
keeps the lien of the mortgage alive after the death of the debtor joint
tenant to the extent of that tenant's interest at the time he mortgaged
it. Assuming William and John were joint tenants in Blackacre, worth
$50,000, each owning an undivided one-half interest, John could have
transferred an interest in Blackacre worth $25,000 before his death.
If John mortgaged his undivided one-half interest in Blackacre to
secure a loan of $30,000, then died, the mortgagee would still be
secured up to the sale price of an undivided one-half interest in
Blackacre (hypothetically $25,000), even though Blackacre is now
owned by William as survivor. 48 If the loan was for $10,000, then the
47. Harms, 105 I11.2d at 226, 473 N.E.2d at 935.
48. If the debtor John survives, the mortgage should remain attached only to
his original moiety, if that is what he described in the mortgage. In other words,
assuming that John secured the $30,000 debt by a mortgage of "an undivided onehalf interest in Blackacre," then even if John survives to the entire interest, the
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mortgage will be fully satisfied, and William will benefit by $15,000.
In either event, William will be no worse off than if the statute had
not been passed and John had severed to obtain the loan.
The rest of the proposed statute provides for notice to the nonmortgaging joint tenant. He is entitled to notice of a mortgage that
can affect the interest to which he may succeed just as he is entitled
to notice of a severance. Unless that notice is given, the surviving,
non-mortgaging joint tenant will take free of the mortgage. Obviously,
it will behove the mortgagee to make sure that notice is given, but as
in the notice of severance statute, the method for satisfying the notice
requirement is simple and certain and in most cases will result in the
tenant's actual knowledge of the mortgage.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the statutes proposed in the appendices, or similar ones, are
adopted, they, together with the law established by State Bank and
Harms, will advance the goals of: (1) effectuating the legitimate
expectations of the parties to a joint tenancy; (2) protecting the lender
in secured transactions and thereby facilitating the flow of credit
without unwanted and unnecessary side arrangements; and (3) promoting informed decision-making by one tenant in real property when
a cotenant takes action that affects the former's interest. They may
well be models for adoption by other states. At the present time only
two states have statutes protecting creditors of a joint tenant, 49 and
none has been found requiring notice to a passive joint tenant of
action taken that vitally affects her interest. As American jurisprudence focuses more on economic and social policies and less on ritual
incantations (four unities of joint tenancies, title or lien theory of
mortgages) as tools for analysis, these goals will become more explicit.

mortgage should remain attached only to "an undivided one-half interest in Black-,
acre," absent an after-acquired property clause in the mortgage. The argument has
been made, however, that, like a judgment lien attaching to after-acquired property,
the mortgage should attach to the entire property. See People v. Nugarr, 164 Cal.
App. 2d 591, 330 P.2d 858 (1958); Zeigler v. Bonnell, 52 Cal. App. 2d 217, 126 P.2d
118 (1942).
49. See supra note 42.

APPENDIX 1
Notice of severance of estate in joint tenancy. Severance of an
estate in joint tenancy with right of survivorship by one joint tenant
or fewer than all joint tenants by conveyance or by written declaration

of election to sever the joint tenancy shall be effective only upon
notice to the other joint tenant(s). The burden of proving notice shall
be upon the person alleging the severance.* For the purpose of
effectuating the severance proof of either of the following shall be
conclusive:
a) Recording of an affidavit by any person over the age of
eighteen that the affiant personally served each tenant affected
by the severance of the joint tenancy with a copy of the
severing conveyance or declaration. The affidavit may be
recorded with the severing conveyance or declaration.
b) Certification by the recorder of the county in which the
land is located in substantially the following form:

*DRAFTER'S NOTE
If severance is an issue in any litigation, the proposed statute allows the party
alleging severance to prove notice by any relevant facts that would show communication to the passive tenant of the contents of the severance document or bring home
to him the import of the severing tenant's acts and intent.
Two methods of notice are specifically provided: a) affidavit of personal
service, and b) certification by recorder. (For land titles registered in Cook County
under the Torrens system, corresponding provisions should be made for registration
of the affidavit of personal service and certification by the registrar.) Proof of either,
however, is conclusive on the issue of severance. The purpose of the two specific
methods is to promote security in the title examination process. For example, if a
title examiner finds: that A and B were joint tenants; that A conveyed his interest to
C; that an affiant swore to personal service on B of a copy of the severing conveyance;
or that the recorder certified to mailing a copy to B, then the examiner can with
confidence conclude that the A-B joint tenancy has been severed and that C has the
interest of a tenant in common with B.
It is, of course, possible that either of the conclusive methods set forth for
notifying the passive joint tenancy may fail actually to transmit the knowledge of the
severance. The affiant who swears to personal service may lie. The recorder may
certify to the mailing but forget to mail. The address provided the recorder by
affidavit may be in error. Nonetheless, the tenancy will have been effectively secured.
Should these cases arise, however, the tenant as to whom severance will operate will
be in no worse position than she is now with no statute mandating notice. In drafting
a statute, a presumption is justified that affidavits are normally truthful and that
perjury is rare. In the great majority of cases, the tenant as to whom severance
operates will be informed.
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"I hereby certify that I have mailed, on [date], a copy of:
the conveyance whereby [grantor, i.e., severing joint
tenant] conveyed his interest in the real property described therein to [himself as tenant in common; or
name of grantee, if a third party],
or
the declaration of election to sever joint tenancy
signed by [name of severingjoint tenant],
thereby dissolving rights of survivorship heretofore existing
in the joint tenancy. The copy of the conveyance or declaration was mailed to the following tenant(s) at the address(es) indicated, furnished to me by the severing joint
tenant as the last known correct mailing address of said
tenant(s):

Recorder,

County, Illinois

The certification shall be issued by the recorder upon the submission of the severing conveyance or declaration with sufficient
copies for mailing, stamped envelopes properly addressed to each
tenant affected by the severance of the joint tenancy, and an affidavit
that the address(es) furnished is/are the last known correct mailing
address(es) of said tenant(s).
The affidavit and the recorder's certification, which may be on
a single page, may be recorded with the severing conveyance or
declaration.

APPENDIX

2

Joint tenancy survivorship subject to mortgage. A real estate
mortgage on the interest of a joint tenant does not defeat the right of
survivorship in the event of the death of such joint tenant, but the
surviving joint tenant or tenants take the interest that such deceased
joint tenant could have transferred prior to death subject to such
mortgage. Provided, however: The surviving, non-mortgaging joint
tenant or tenants will take free of any such mortgage unless within 30
days of the execution of the mortgage he was notified of that execution.
The burden of proving notice shall be upon the person attempting to
enforce the mortgage.* For the purpose of proving notice of the
execution of the mortgage proof of either of the following shall be
conclusive:
a) Recording of an affidavit by any person over the age of
eighteen that the affiant personally served each non-mortgaging
joint tenant with a copy of the mortgage instrument. The
affidavit may be recorded with the mortgage.
b) Certification by the recorder of the county in which the land
is located in substantially the following form:
"I hereby certify that I have mailed, on [date], a copy
of the mortgage wherein
isthe mortgagor and
is mortgagee as to the
property described therein, executed on [date]. The copy
of the mortgage was mailed to the following tenant(s) at
the address(es) indicated, furnished to me by the mortgaging joint tenant as the last known correct mailing
address of the non-mortgaging joint tenant(s):

Recorder

County, Illinois

The certification shall be issued by the recorder upon the submission
of the copy or copies of the mortgage for mailing, stamped envelopes
* See DRAFTER'S NOTE accompanying Appendix 1.
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property addressed to each non-mortgaging joint tenant, and an affidavit that the address(es) furnished is/are the last known correct mailing
address(es) of the said tenant(s).
The affidavit and the recorder's certification, which may be on a
single page, may be recorded with the mortgage.

